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Knox: Competition in Computers

NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAW ON
MONOPOLY: THE IMPACT OF THE IBM
WEST COAST CASES
Robert L. Knox*
Chroniclers of the development of public policy toward monopoly may someday regard the 1970's as an important watershed in that development. The main events of that decade revolved around a series of court decisions involving International
Business Machines Corporation (IBM). The issues dealt with
IBM's response to burgeoning competition from manufacturers
who produced peripheral devices that could be attached to IBM
systems, thus replacing the corresponding IBM product. After
years of litigation, IBM has been acquitted of monopoly charges.
This article explores the reasons for that acquittal and discusses
the implications for competitive behavior in general.
I.

INTRODUCTION

An exhaustive analysis of monopolization litigation divides
the process into three historical stages. l Stage I ended with the
U.S. Steel case of 1920 and was characterized as the "abuse theory" of monopolization. 2 Firms would be found guilty of violating Section 2 of the Sherman Act3 if the record revealed a pattern of overt predatory acts specifically designed to enhance
market position at the expense of identifiable competitors, actual or potential.·
Stage II began in the late 1930's and ended in the 1950's,
with the centerpieces being the Alcoa decision of 1945 supported
• Professor of Economics, Arizona State University; Ph.D., Economics, University of
North Carolina, 1963; M.S. Economics, Oklahoma State University, 1958; B.S. Economics, Oklahoma State University, 1954.
1. Flynn, Monopolization Under the Sherman Act: The Third Wave and Beyond,
26 ANTITRUST BULLETIN 1 (1981), [hereinafter cited as Flynn].
2. U.S. v. United States Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417 (1920).
3. 15 U.S.C.A. Paragraphs 1-7 (1980).
4. Standard Oil v. U.S., 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
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in 1953 by United Shoe.r; The major premise of this stage was a
determination that a firm with a large share of a market could
be guilty of monopolizing if its conduct were judged to be exclusionary in the sense that actual competitors could not grow or
potential competitors were intimidated and hence would not
enter the market. 6 Such conduct enabled a firm to acquire or
maintain monopoly power even though the conduct itself was
not abusive or predatory.7 Emphasis was on the structure of the
market and the resulting behavior that enabled the firm to
maintain its market position. 8 Stage II recognized that a firm's
market position might be the result of natural market forces or
might evolve from "superior skill and foresight," but the pivotal
cases gave little guidance as to what conduct met these criteria. 9
Efforts by alleged monopolists to employ the "thrust upon" or
"superior skill and foresight" defenses were unsuccessfu1. 10 At
the close of this stage, the legal test for monopolization was definitively summarized in U.S. v. Grinnell Corp.:ll
The offense of monopoly under Section 2 of the
Sherman Act has two elements: (1) the possession
of monopoly power in the relevant market, and
(2) the willful acquisition or maintenance of that
power as distinguished from growth or development as a consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic accident . . . .12
This test requires a two-stage inquiry. First, the degree of
monopoly power must be determined in an appropriately defined market. The intensity of the competitive pressures, if any,
felt by the alleged monopolist must be reduced to an economically defensible number - the market share of the defendant. 13
Once this threshold has been surmounted, attention shifts to the
5. u.s. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (1945); U.S. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (1953), aff'd 347 U.S. 521 (1954).
6. U.S. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d at 429-45.
7. See P. ASCH, ECONOMIC THEORY AND THE ANTiTRUST DILEMMA at 255 (1970).
8. U.S. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 110 F. Supp. at 342.
9. U.S. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d at 430.
10. U.S. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 110 F. Supp. at 343.
11. U.S. v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563 (1966).
12. [d. at 570-71.
13. Problems of market definition and market share determination are thoroughly
discuased in F. FISHER, J. MCGOWAN and J. GREENWOOD, FOLDED, SPINDLED, AND MUTILATED: ECONOMIC ANALYSIS AND U.S. v. IBM at 43-49 (1983) [hereinafter cited as FISHER).
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conduct of the alleged monopolist. Was the monopoly power
achieved, maintained, or strengthened by business practices
which are unjustifiable and which unnecessarily exclude rivals
by damaging the competitive process? Distinguishing between
such practices and those resulting from a superior product or
business acumen become the essential issue of a monopolization
case. I f
Stage III began in the late 1960's with the Section 2 cases
filed against International Business Machines Corporation by
Control Data Corporation 1& and the Department of Justice. 1s
This stage has developed largely through private litigation, although some key government cases have provided important impetus. Its focal point is the effort by private litigants to challenge IBM's leading position in the electronic data processing
industry and the parallel effort by the Department of Justice to
dissolve IBM.17 In addition, a private case against Eastman Kodak and government cases against DuPont, oil companies, and
the cereal companies attempted to break new ground in the legal
approach to monopoly.18
Stage III furthered the use of economic analysis in monopoly cases to analyze the behavior of the alleged monopolist in an
effort to define what type of conduct could be construed as exclusionary and hence anticompetitive, and what type of conduct
represented a reasonable response by a large firm to competition
from rivals. 19 The alleged monopolists were all large in an absolute sense and occupied leading positions in their respective
markets. In most cases the firms were generally regarded as progressive in technology and well-managed.20
If Stage III is ultimately judged to signal a new era in the
development of public policy toward monopoly, it will largely be
14. [d. at 24·41.
15. Control Date Corporation v. International Business Machines Corp., 318 F.
Supp. 145 (1970).
16. U.S. v. International Business Machines Corp., No. 69-200 (S.D. N.Y.) (1969).
17. [d.

18. Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979); In the
Matter of E.J. DuPont De Nemours & Company, FTC Docket No. 9108; In re Exxon
Corp., et al., FTC Docket No. 8934; In re Kellog Co., et al., FTC Docket No. 8883.
19. Flynn, supra note 1 at 34-36, 118.
20. For a discussion of important Stage III cases, see Flynn, supra note 1 at 22-29.
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because of a series of Section 2 cases and court decisions involving IBM. The recent withdrawal of its massive case by the Department of Justice signals a close of the IBM litigation and affords an opportunity to assess the results of several private cases
which essentially involved the same issues and which therefore
suggest the direction Stage III is taking. All the cases began and
most were concluded in the 1970'S.21 The plaintiffs were competitors of IBM in the electronic data processing industry, a field
that has experienced the most rapid growth and changing technology of any in the American economy in this century.
II. BACKGROUND
The history of the IBM litigation dates from the previously
identified Control Data and Department of Justice suits. However, the former was settled prior to trial and the latter was
eventually withdrawn. Consequently, the new developments in
the application of Section 2 are based on cases involving companies that manufacture or lease electronic data processing equipment used primarily with and competing against IBM products.
Plaintiffs in the cases were: Telex Corporation, California
Computer Products (CalComp), Memorex Corporation, Greyhound Computer Leasing Corporation and Transamerica Leasing Corporation. The first three were manufacturers of electronic
data processing equipment and the last two were leasing companies. 22 Telex resulted in a verdict against IBM at the trial level,
but was reversed by an appeals court and settled before Supreme Court review. CalComp resulted in a directed verdict for
IBM at the close of the plaintiff's case, later affirmed at the ap21. Greyhound Computer Corp. v. IBM, 559 F.2d 488 (9 Cir. 1977); California Computer Products, Inc. v. IBM, 613 F.2d 727 (9th Cir. 1979) [hereinafter cited as CalComp];
Telex Corp. v. IBM, 510 F.2d 894 (10th Cir. 1975); ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp. v.
IBM, 458 F. Supp. 423 (N.D. Cal. 1978) [hereinafter cited as Memorex]; Transamerica
Computer Co. v. IBM, 481 F. Supp. 965 (N.D. Cal. 1979) [hereinafter cited as
Transamerica].
22. A leasing company purchases equipment from a manufacturer and markets that
equipment to end users through various types of lease arrangements. It is not uncommon
for a leasing company to displace a company's product on lease with an identical substitute purchased from the same company. For example, a leasing company might purchase
a System/370 central processor from IBM and lease it to a bank which already had a
similar or identical machine. For this to occur, the leasing company would have to offer
better terms than IBM.
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peals level, and no petition for certiorari was filed. Memorex was
fully litigated and resulted in a directed verdict for IBM; the
judgment was later affirmed by the appeals court,23 and the Supreme Court denied certiorari. 24 Greyhound yielded a directed
verdict for IBM at the close of the plaintiff's case, was later reversed and remanded by an appeals court, but was settled before
the second trial began. Transamerica was fully litigated26 and
the trial judge entered a directed verdict for IBM; the decision
was affirmed on appeal. 26 Juries were involved in both Memorex
and Transamerica, but were unable to render a decision. Numerous federal judges have analyzed the issues and arguments
and generally the results have been the same. IBM has been acquitted of charges that it monopolized the electronic data
processing industry.

III.

ISSUES

IBM was one of the pioneers in the development of electronic data processing. Although it was not the first firm to build
a computer, it was the first to commit itself fully to the fledgling
industry in the 1950's. IBM started from an established base in
the office tabulating field, where it was a leader, and quickly rose
to prominence along with several other firms in the development
of electronic data processing (EDP) systems. It was in the forefront of new technological developments in a relatively short period of time - approximately twenty-five years. IBM did not
develop all of the innovations, but it had its share and was quick
to capitalize on developments by others, both inside and outside
the industry. Its preeminence was 'hardly disputable, and, in
1964, it brought out the 360 line of electronic data processing
systems. 27 The development represented an important commitment to developing a full line of compatible hardware, ranging
from a relatively small to a very large and powerful system that
was fully compatible with support hardware and software. However, it laid the foundation for the subsequent monopoly litiga23. Memorex Corp., etc., et aI. v. IBM Corp., 636 F.2d 1188 (9th Cir. 1980).
24. 69 L. Ed. 2d 983 (1981).
25. Transamerica, 481 F. Supp. 965.
26. Transamerica Computer Co. v. IBM Corp., 698 F.2d 1377 (9th Cir. 1983).
27. For a discussion of the development of the computer industry and particularly
the development of the IBM System/360, see FISHER, supra note 13, at 5-11. See also, A.
McADAMS, THE COMPUTER INDUSTRY, THE STRUCTURE OF AMERICAN INDUSTRY (1982).
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tion of the 1970's..
This litigation can be identified conveniently as the IBM
West Coast cases, since most of the major plaintiffs were headquartered in California and the court trials and subsequent appeals were all in the Ninth Circuit. The Telex case was the primary antecedent, and the verdict against IBM at the trial level
in the case spawned and encouraged CalComp, Memorex and
Transamerica. 28
To understand the issues in the West Coast cases it is important to visualize an electronic data processing system. Such a
system consists of several devices known as hardware, most notable of which is the central processing unit (CPU). This device
performs the calculations involved in a computer process after
receiving information from other devices known as peripherals.
The CPU produces output that flows to and from other peripherals. The entire process is controlled by software, which tells
the CPU and attending peripherals what to do. Systems manufacturers, such as IBM, produce and market all of the hardware
and software required to transform the raw information into usable output. Other companies concentrate on producing and
marketing one or more of the peripheral devices, such as a disk
file, a terminal or a printer. Still others serve as intermediaries,
purchasing hardware from systems manufacturers and peripheral companies and remarketing these devices to end users
through leasing arrangements. Of the major plaintiffs in the
West Coast cases, CalComp and Memorex were manufacturers
of peripheral devices and Transamerica was a leasing company
that purchased these products from other manufacturers such as
Telex.
Companies such as CalComp and Memorex were known as
plug-compatible manufacturers (PCMs). These companies produced peripheral devices that could be attached to IBM systems,
thereby replacing the corresponding IBM product. For example,
Memorex would obtain an IBM tape drive or disk drive reverseengineer the device, and offer it to users of IBM equipment as a
substitute for an existing IBM tape or disk drive. During the
reverse-engineering process, PCMs sometimes improved the
28. Telex Corp. v. IBM Corp., 367 F. Supp. 258 (N.D. Okla. 1973).
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product so it had considerable appeal to users, who could replace an existing IBM device with a PCM device that would either be the equivalent of or an improvement on the IBM product. Since the PCMs had little or no development costs, and
since they were duplicating only successful IBM products, they
could offer the peripheral at a lower price than IBM's compatible product. The lower price was also necessary to compete
against IBM's established reputation for quality products and
services. Users of IBM equipment had to be convinced of better
price and/or performance in the PCM devices to be induced to
make the substitution. Within the electronic data processing industry, therefore, a group of companies developed that staked
their success on duplicating IBM peripheral devices and offering
them to users at lower prices. The success of this business strategy is evidenced by the fact that in the early 1970's, PCMs were
growing rapidly and replacing IBM equipment at an accelerating
rate. lIe
However, this strategy was risky. Essentially it was based on
two premises: First, the PCMs could copy the most successful
IBM devices rapidly enough to produce sufficient profit to withstand obsolescence of their equipment through new and/or im29.

Year
1968
1969

SEindles
150
1,050

1970

PCM Placements and Revenues
Disks
($ Million)
(Drives)
23.7

. Tapes
($ Million)

4.3

SO.8

850
2,950

29.9

4,833

110.6

4,169

135.4

1971

12,402

162.6

5,931

312.3

1972
1973

14,898

183.9
307.8
307.8

6,962
12,272

378.6
689.8

1974

22,600
22,600

12,272

689.8

1975

26,585

352.5

13,607

854.3

Defendant's Exhibit 6515, p. 34, as cited in Brief of Appellee, Transamerica v. IBM, 699
F.2d 1377 (9th Cir. 1983) at 16 [hereinafter cited as mM's Transamerica Appeals Brief].
Evidence offered in Transamerica showed that PCM list prices for virtually identical products were fifteen to twenty percent below mM prices and often included discounts off list and other inducements such as free maintenance. In early 1971, IBM's
monthly sales of peripherals were only nineteen percent of its projection. During the first
five months of 1971, PCM's net installations of 2314 disk-type spindles rose from 2,000
to 6,500. mM projected that it would lose ninety percent of its leased 2314/2319 disk
installations by the end of 1973. mM's Transamerica Appeals Brief, supra at 13-14.
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proved technology; and second, IBM would not counter this rapidly emerging competition through product innovations and/or
price reductions. 30 Rather, it was an implicit strategic assumption that IBM would continue to provide a price umbrella over
the PCMs that would enable them to flourish by replicating
IBM products and offering them at lower prices. The soundness
of this strategy and the ultimate results constituted the major
issue in the West Coast cases. 31
As the PCMs grew and prospered, IBM found itself losing
peripheral business. Users of IBM equipment on thirty-day lease
were replacing that equipment and IBM became alarmed at the
quantity of its peripherals coming off lease. Since peripherals account for somewhere between fifty and seventy-five percent of
the value of a system, IBM viewed the PCMs as an important
competitive threat, so important that it designated peripheral
competition as a Key Corporate Strategic Issue and established
a high-level executive group to study not only the threat but also
some of the companies that individually posed that threat. 32 The
group, known within IBM as the Peripherals Task Force, had
the responsibility of making recommendations as to how IBM
could counter the growing competition. 33
Monopoly cases have both structural and behavioral dimensions. The structure centers on the determination of a relevant
market while the behavior focuses on the conduct of the alleged
monopolist. In many cases market definition is crucial because it
is a hurdle the plaintiff must surmount before proceeding to the
conduct issues. 34 Market definition in the West Coast cases was
complex, largely because of the rapid growth and changing technology that characterize electronic data processing. However, it
became a secondary issue because the trial and appellate courts
simply assumed that IBM had monopoly power and proceeded
to analyze its behavior.35 Thus the West Coast cases centered on
30. CalComp, 613 F.2d at 738-40.
31. IBM's Post-Trial Brief, Transamerica Computer Co. v. IBM Corp., Northern
District of California, Civil Action No. C-73-1832-RHS, at 4-6 [hereinafter cited as
IBM's Transamerica Post-Trial Brief].
32. Appellants' Opening Brief, Memorex Corp. v. IBM Corp., 636 F.2d 1188 (9th
Cir. 1980), at 33.
33. [d. at 34-37.
34. Transamerica, 481 F. Supp. at 974-76.
35. CaiComp, 613 F.2d at 738.
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conduct. Since even a monopolist can compete, the question became: When a firm has monopoly power in some relevant market, what sort of conduct can it pursue in response to competitive pressures that is not unreasonably restrictive of competition?38
IBM's response to the competitive pressures generated by
the PCMs can usefully be analyzed under three categories: (1)
price, (2) marketing, and (3) product or technology. The strategies did not exist in isolation; they were interrelated and to some
extent sequential. However, understanding is facilitated by looking at each strategy in turn. It must be remembered that price/
performance is the key to competition in the electronic data
processing industry.37
A.

Pricing

As already indicated above, PCM peripheral prices were
considerably below those of the IBM equivalents. The principal
IBM product that had been replicated by the PCMs was the
2314 disk drive. A disk drive is a device that stores data for
processing on vertically stacked disks resembling phonograph
records. Heads, which are mounted on arms, fly over the disks
and electronically read the data already recorded, or, alternatively, record new data onto the disk. The stacks of disks are
called spindles, and a disk drive may contain one or more spindles. The 2314, which was IBM's most popular drive, came in
one-, two-, and four-spindle models.
The disk drive is attached to the CPU through a standalone device called. a controller. The controller serves as an intermediary between the drive and the processor, regulating the
input and output of data. The drive and the control unit were
marketed together as a subsystem of both IBM and PCMs.

IBM had been developing a process known as "native attachment."38 This process would eliminate the stand-alone control unit and allow the disk drive to attach directly to the CPU,
36. [d. at 735-36.
37. FISHER, supra note 13, at 131.
38. Appellee's Brief, supra note 32, at 48-50.
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thereby saving costs and improving performance. This process
was known as "Apricot," and the interface for native attachment
was the same as the one between IBM's disk drives and their
control units. The interface between the control unit and the
CPU had been copied by the PCMs which enabled their subsystem (drive plus control unit) to attach to the IBM CPU. However, since the PCMs were interested only in attaching to the
CPU, they had not copied the interface between IBM's disk
drive and control unit. 89
This did not present a problem for the PCMs, however, because the Apricot interface was known in the marketplace and
could have been duplicated by the PCMs had it been chosen by
IBM for the native attachment. 4o Instead, IBM developed a new
interface, designated "Mallard," which would be used with its
new disk drive, the 2319AY This drive was a remanufactured
four-spindle 2314 with one spindle removed in order to house
the electronics which permitted native attachment through the
Mallard interface. 42
The 2319A was IBM's initial response to the competitive inroads of the PCMs. This disk drive attached natively to two of
the most popular models of the 370 CPU through the Mallard
interface. Since the 2319A was a reuse of the displaced 2314
drive without a controller, it could be priced. below it. The price
chosen was $1,000 per month rental for the three-spindle drive. 48
This price narrowed considerably the differential between IBM
and its PCM competitors. Moreover, the PCMs could not attach
their substitutes to the 370 CPU without reengineering the interface. They charged IBM with predatory behavior designed to
halt the growing PCM displacement of the IBM disk drives. 44
Prices were alleged to be predatory, since PCMs were forced to
reduce the prices of their 2314 substitutes, and the product was
39. IBM's Transamerica Appeals Brief, supra note 29, at 82.
40. [d. at 83.
41. [d. at 84.
42. Transamerica, 481 F. Supp. at 1004-5.
43. The lower price for the 2319A stemmed from the reuse program. The marginal
cost of converting a displaced 2314 to a 2319A was considerably below the cost of developing an entirely new drive. Hence, the price could be lower and, even if the perform. ance was constant, users still would find the 2319A attractive because of a better price/
performance ratio.
44. Transamerica, 481 F. Supp. at 1004-5.
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said to be predatory because the new interface precluded them
from attaching their drives.
1.

Was IBM's Pricing Predatory?

Since the turn-of-the-century monopoly cases of Standard
Oil4& and American Tobacco;'6 predatory pricing has been recognized as an abuse of monopoly power. A firm might sell a product below its costs, deliberately incurring short-term losses, until
rivals are sufficiently disciplined or driven from the marketplace.
Then the predator can raise the price to the monopoly level,
thereby ensuring above-normal profits. Economists, however,
have questioned the rationality of this behavior. The predator
would need a "deep pocket" to sustain the losses until rivals are
eliminated.·' Moreover, once the pricejs raised to the monopoly
level, new firms will enter the market or older ones will reappear
and the predator must repeat the process. It might be cheaper
simply to buyout the rivals one is trying to eliminate.
Concern over the prevalence of predatory pricing and a
method of determining when it exists led to the famous
"Areeda-Turner" rule.·s Professors Areeda and Turner, using
conventional microeconomic analysis, argued that a cost-based
test should be used.· 9 Prices are predatory if they are below
marginal cost, or as an alternative, average variable cost. These
costs belong to the predator, not the rival. Prices below the rival's marginal or average variable costs but above the alleged
predator's are not predatory but merely serve to impact or eliminate a less efficient rival. GO Presumably, this provides an objective standard that permits decision-makers to predict the legal
45. Standard Oil v. U.S., 221 U.S. 1.
46. U.S. v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911).
47. McGee, Predatory Price Cutting: The Standard Oil (N.J.) Case, 1 JOURNAL OF
LAw AND ECONOMICS 137 (1958). See also Koller, The Myth of Predatory Pricing, 4 ANTI-

TRUST LAW AND ECONOMICS REVIEW 105 (1971).
48. Areeda and Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices Under Section 2
of the Sherman Act, 88 HARv. L. REV. 697 (1975).
49. The literature on predatory pricing is voluminous. For a good summary see HAY,
A CONFUSED LAWYER'S GUIDE TO THE PREDATORY PRICING LITERATURE, STRATEGY, PREDATION AND ANTITRUST ANALYSIS, (Federal Trade Commission) (1981) and the numerous
citations therein.
50. Areeda and Turner, supra note 48, at 709.
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consequences of their acts. III
In the West Coast cases, plaintiffs argued that IBM's pricing of the 2319A was predatory, designed to inflict maximum
damage on the PCMs.1I2 This price, according to the PCMs, was
chosen after careful study of their costs and prices and was set
low enough to ensure that if they responded with even lower
prices, their profits would be seriously impaired. 1I3
In cases in the Ninth Circuit, the Areeda-Turner rule had
been used as a test for predatory pricing. 1I4 Consequently, the
PCMs had to show that IBM's prices were below its marginal or
average variable costs. In neither CalComp nor Memorex did the
plaintiff offer evidence to support this claim. Transamerica attempted to show predatory pricing by an after-the-fact analysis
of IBM's internal pricing procedures. 1I1I Like most firms, IBM
had a formalized procedure for arriving at announcement prices
for new products. This procedure relied on expected demand,
product life, direct manufacturing costs, and an allocation of indirect costs based on some standard, in this case revenue apportionment. lle Based on this procedure, IBM argued that the announcement price chosen for the 2319A was above its costs and
therefore expected to be profitable. II? Since IBM followed its
usual pricing procedure and the PCMs did not offer evidence
showing prices below IBM's cost, the courts rejected the predatory pricing allegation. liS In addition, in Memorex a meetingcompetition rule was promulgated (MC/AVC). Even a firm with
monopoly power is permitted to respond to competition by reducing prices absent any showing that the prices were below
51. Id. at 698.
52. In addition, since the PCMs argued that the 2319A and the 2314 disk file were
the same product, they alleged that the lower price on the 2319A was also discriminatory. The weakness of this argument is discussed in FISHER, supra note 13, at 316-17.
53. Appellants' Opening Brief, supra note 32, at 46.
54. Hansen y. Shell Oil Co., 541 F.2d 1352 (9th Cir. 1976); Janich Bros., Inc. v.
American Distilling Co., 570 F.2d 848 (9th Cir. 1977); Murphy Tugboat Co. v. Crowley,
467 F. Supp. 841 (1979) aff'd 658 F.2d 1256 (9th Cir. 1981).
55. Transamerica's Opening Post-Trial Brief, 481 F. Supp. 695 (N.D. Cal. 1979) at
109-112.
56. Transamerica, 481 F. Supp. at 997-98.
57. IBM's Transamerica Post-Trial Brief, 481 F. Supp. 965 (N.D. Cal. 1979) at 3445.
58. Memorex, 458 F. Supp. at 431.
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marginal or average variable costs. liB In the course of developing
this cost-based rule of meeting competition, several variations
emerged.
In CalComp, for example, the court indicated a somewhat
stronger standard than the MCIAVC rule. It noted that prices
might be predatory if they were above MCIAVC but below the
short-run profit maximizing price provided entry barriers· were
high.60 This standard is analogous to the economic concept of
"limit pricing," where a firm sets a price to deter the entry of
new firms or the expansion of existing firms. Presumably this
price is above its own costs, but below those of a potential entrant or a less efficient rival.
However, the Memorex court rejected this possibility, noting that the record did not support the conjecture that IBM was
pursuing a limit price strategy, primarily because of the absence
of significant entry barriers. 61 Indeed, the record of rapid entry
of new firms into all areas of electronic data processing was
overwhelming.
The Transamerica court promulgated a more rigorous cost
test than the Areeda-Turner rule. It required that prices equal
or exceed average total costs. 6l1 The plaintiff, Transamerica, attempted to show that IBM's pricing procedure would always
produce prices that exceed average total cost and, moreover,
that costs were improperly determined. The court rejected these
after-the-fact adjustments, citing mM's use of its normal pricing
procedure.
In summary, on the pricing issue, the CalComp, Memorex,
and Transamerica courts were unanimous in rejecting plaintiffs'
claims of predatory pricing. IBM's evidence that prices set at
announcement, based on a standard pricing procedure, were e~
pected to produce substantial profits and follow-up studies
showing actual profitability sufficiently rebutted the predatory
pricing allegation.
59. [d.
so. CalComp, S13 F.2d at 742-43.
Sl. Memorex, 458 F. Supp. at 433.
S2. Transamerica, 481 F. Supp. at 995.
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Technology

The plaintiffs in the West Coast cases attacked the 2319A
(and its counterpart, the 2319B) as a product manipulation, the
sole purpose of which was to preclude the PCMs from attaching
their IBM copies to the 370 and 360 CPUs. They argued that
IBM had no new technology available to combat the competition
of the PCMs and therefore attempted to buy some time by developing a product that did not have improved technology but
simply made life more difficult for their rivals. Moreover, they
argued that IBM switched from the planned use of the interface
Apricot, whose electronics were known, to Mallard, whose electronics were not, simply to preclude further PCM penetration of
the peripheral market.
IBM's response to these allegations centered, as might be
expected, on the technical improvements in the disk drives and
their overall enhancement of the IBM systems. In a rapidly
changing technological environment, it is inevitable that engineers will differ as to the appropriate design change. Even
within IBM disagreement occurred, a fact strongly emphasized
by the plaintiffs. The abandonment of one approach to attaching
disk drives (Apricot) for another (Mallard) was cited by the
plaintiffs as evidence that IBM chose the design most disadvantageous to the PCMs. This design, however, could be construed
as most advantageous to IBM from an overall competitive viewpoint, given the fact that peripherals account for such an important part of an electronic data processing system.
The issue of choice among alternative strategies, in this instance involving the interface, was an important element in determining the extent to which a monopolist can respond to growing competition that is eroding its market position. In the
dispute over the choice of Mallard over Apricot, plaintiffs in the
West Coast cases argued that, since the Apricot interface could
be more easily replicated, it should have been chosen. It represented a "softer alternative," a choice that would generate
weaker competitive pressures. The CalComp court dealt with
this issue forthrightly when it observed:
IBM, assuming it was a monopolist, had the right
to redesign its products to make them more attractive to buyers - whether by reason of lower
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manufacturing cost and price or improved performance. It was under no duty to help CalComp
or other peripheral equipment manufacturers survive or expand. IBM need not have provided its
rivals with disk products to examine and copy nor
have constricted its product development so as to
facilitate sales of rival products. 68

Specifically, IBM argued that the native attachment aspect
of the 2319A offered cost savings in general, and putting part of
the disk control electronics in the drive simplified maintenance,
freed space in the central processor for other features and allowed for growth and possible future design modifications. 6ol Either of the proposals for native attachment would have required
an interface modification by the PCMs to permit their substitute 2314 drives to attach to the 370 intermediate systems.
PCMs argued that it would have been easier to modify their
products to attach under the Apricot program than under the
Mallard program, both from a cost and time standpoint.6C1 However, IBM produced evidence that showed that the modification
of the 2319A was relatively easy, requiring approximately thirty
days of engineering effort.66
The nub of the dispute over design changes was both engineering and economic. In the latter case, the question was simply whether it would be more profitable for the PCMs to devote
resources to reengineering their products to cope with the interface changes of 2319A or continue to produce their 2314 disk
and controller subsystem that could still attach to all of the 370
systems as previously. With the price advantage the PCMs enjoyed over IBM's compatible 2314 drives, fulfilling replacement
orders, of which a backlog existed, seemed more profitable. 67
Thus, the court in Memorex 68 refused to become enmeshed
in an engineering dispute as to which design, Apricot or Mallard,
was preferable, and which design would have the least competi63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

CalComp, 613 F.2d at 744.
Transamerica, 481 F. Supp. at 1004-05.
[d.
mM's Transamerica Appeals Brief, supra note 29, at 83.
[d.
Memorex, 458 F. Supp. at 439.
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tive impact on the PCMs. It resolved the issue in favor of IBM
on the grounds that the changes were based on sound engineering judgment and represented a competitive response by IBM to
growing competition in disk drives and complete systems. 69
1. Other Design Changes70

IBM's response to competition of PCMs in the area of disk
products was also adopted in tape drives. Older products were
superceded by technologically improved products which were
sold or leased at lower prices. PCM plaintiffs attacked this strategy as simply "old wine in new bottles," the purpose of which
was to destroy PCM competition through a disguised price cut. 71
Specifically, IBM announced a tape subsystem consisting of a
new control unit (the 3803) and a new drive (the 3420). The entire project was code-named "Aspen."72 PCM plaintiffs did not
dispute the technical superiority of the control unit but argued
that the tape drive was simply a refurbished drive of older technology which required a new interface between the drive and the
controller and thus precluded the PCMs from attaching their
tape drives of the older.technology to the new controller. 73 IBM
argued that, because the new controller was a superior product,
it required a new interface to work with the tape drive, and .
therefore a new tape drive was necessary.7. As to pricing, the
Aspen system was profitable. Moreover, PCMs were not precluded from attaching their new tape drives, and one PCM
(Telex) announced an Aspen copy in short order. The trial court
in Transamerica found Aspen to be a product improvement offered at a lower price and consequently a reasonable response to
competition, noting that the antitrust laws do not protect competitors from product competition. 7G
Another reuse program for tape drives (Mandan) involved
similar issues. Older model tape drives had been returned to
69. [d. at 440.
70. Other design changes and their impact are discussed in Transamerica, 481 F.
Supp. at 1003-8.
n. [d. at 1004·05.
72. [d. at 1005.
73. [d.

74. IBM's Transamerica Appeals Brief, supra note 29, at 94.
75. Transamerica, 481 F. Supp. at 1004.
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IBM from lease. Rather than incur the expense of storage or
scrapping, IBM reused the older drives by changing seven wires
and offered the new drive to customers who preferred a lowercost alternative to Aspen. 76 The Transamerica trial court found
that the interface change did not preclude PCMs from attaching
their drives to the control unit had they wished to make the disclosed changes in the older technology drives. 77 Therefore, Mandan was a project which produced a tape drive of at least equal
if not superior quality at a lower price.
The final product design change alleged by the PCMs to
have been undertaken by IBM to destroy competition involved
new central processors. In 1972 and 1973 IBM announced two
new models in the 370 family of computers. These models were
the smallest in the product line. 78 The PCMs argued that the
products were deliberately degraded by IBM to prevent attachment of PCM peripherals. 79 This was accomplished, according to
the PCMs, by failing to include an optional selector channel and
also by supplying a slower byte multiplexor channel than had
been previously planned. 80 These designs were alleged to have
prevented the PCMs from attaching older technology tape and
disk drives to the new 370 processors. The Transamerica trial
court determined that IBM had indeed investigated removing
the selector channel primarily to preclude PCM attachment but,
in the course of the investigation, found the selector channel to
be unnecessary from the standpoint of attaching the IBM tape
and disk drives designed for the new CPUS.81 By eliminating it,
IBM saved time and development expense. The tape and disk
drives designed to work with the new processors were natively
attached and offered better performance at lower prices than the
older PCM (and IBM) technology. The Memorex trial court, in
addressing this issue, stated: "[T]he DDA (the native attachment electronics on the 115 and 125s) was a product innovation,
and that IBM was not required to provide a channel on the 125
and 115 to facilitate attachment of Memorex products."82 The
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

[d. at 1003-04.
[d.
[d. at 1006.
[d.
[d. at 1007-08.
[d.
Memorex, 458 F. Supp. at 443.
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byte multiplexor channel was found by the Transamerica trial
court to be too slow in accommodating PCM tape drives. s3 Had
IBM proceeded with the original plans for a faster byte multiplexor on the 370 processors, PCM drives would have attached.
IBM argued that engineering problems caused the slowing, but
the trial court rejected this explanation and found that the degradation of the mUltiplexor was undertaken by IBM solely to
preclude PCM competition. 84 This would have been a Section 2
violation had IBM possessed monopoly power. 811 However, since
no finding was made as to IBM's monopoly power, the conduct
was moot. The trial court also found, however, that Transamerica suffered no damage from this conduct since it did not attempt to develop peripherals to attach to the 155/125s. 86 This
finding in Transamerica is at variance with the CalComp dictum that IBM did not have to orient its product development to
assist competitors.

C. Marketing
Despite the introduction of the 2319A and 2319B, IBM continued to lose placements to the PCMs, who counterattacked by
lowering prices on their 2314 copies. 87 These price cuts occurred
sooner and were deeper than anticipated. Users continued to
have three options in choosing storage capability for their 370
and 360 systems. They could purchase the IBM subsystem (the
2314), they could choose the PCM copy at a significantly lower
price, or they could opt for the 2319 device if native attachment
was preferred. Many continued to choose the PCM alternative
and IBM continued to experience significant returns of their
leased 2314 disk drives. s8
PCM competition continued to be an ongoing problem for
IBM management, and new ways were sought to combat it. After continued study, including some simulations of the impact
on selected PCMs, IBM abandoned its long-standing marketing
policy of leasing equipment for only thirty days and introduced
83. Transamerica, 481 F. Supp. at 1007.
84. [d. at 1008.
85. [d.
86. [d. at 1013.

87. Memorex, 458 F. Supp. at 437.
88. mM's Transamerica Brief, supra note 29, at 1007.
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a long-term lease arrangement known as the Fixed Term Plan
(FTP).89 To appreciate the importance of this change in marketing strategy, one must understand the importance of leasing in
the electronic data processing industry.
IBM pioneered the use of the "risk lease," a thirty-day leasing period which permitted the user of electronic data processing
equipment to change equipment and suppliers in a short period
of time. 90 This concept was beneficial to the user because it permitted a rapid response to changing data-processing needs and
allowed users to switch to newer and improved technology as it
developed. It benefited suppliers like IBM by making it easier
for users to migrate to new equipment. Once a user had installed
a given manufacturer's system, the user would be inclined to
consider replacing that equipment with updated and improved
versions from the same manufacturer.
The risk lease also opened the door for the PCMs. After
copying IBM's most successful products, a PCM could ·confront
a user with an equivalent product at a lower price. Constrained
only by a thirty-day' lease, the user could easily switch from IBM
storage devices to PCM devices and suffer no loss in performance. The risk lease concept was largely responsible for the significant development and growth of PCM competition.
1.

Fixed Term Plan

IBM was the last holdout in the electronic data processing
industry for thirty-day leases. 91 After a special study by another
IBM task force of additional strategies for countering continued
PCM competition, a long-term lease plan was introduced as an
option for users. The plan, called FTP (fixed term plan), and
ETP (extended term plan) provided for a considerable reduction
in lease prices for users who agreed to sign a on~-year or twoyear lease on the equipment. The plan embodied cancellation
charges equivalent to what the user would have paid for a thirtyday lease. 92
89. Memorex, 458 F. Supp. at 437.
90. For a thorough discussion of the economics of leasing, see FISHER, supra note 13,
at 191.
91. IBM's Transamerica Post-Trial Brief, supra note 57, at 68.
92. [d. at 69.
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FTP and ETP applied to peripheral products subject to the
strongest competition by PCMs and could be viewed as a price
cut fostered by lower marketing costs. Users on long-term lease
plans did not require frequent visits by sales representatives in
order to prevent the cancellation of thirty-day leases. Other
firms in the electronic data processing industry employed longterm lease plans and the PCMs had made them the cornerstone
of their competitive strategies. Some PCMs even offered leases
of up to five years with corresponding price reduction. Was
ffiM's adoption of a common industry marketing activity predatory, as alleged by the PCMs, or was it a reasonable response to
competition as alleged by IBM?
This question is answered by reviewing the impact of FTP
on IBM revenues. In all of the West Coast cases, evidence was
presented showing that IBM revenues would be reduced for a
two-year period. 9a However, following this reduction, the plan
was projected to return an increase in revenue and profit
through expanded demand and increased volume, which would
overcome the effect of the discount. 94 The decrease in revenue
over the first two years of FTP was cited by plaintiffs as a classic
"short-run reduction in revenue" designed to drive out competitors, with the implication that prices subsequently would be
raised to higher levels to increase profit. 95 The IBM profit projections, however, assumed no price change after the initial FTP
reduction and it was obvious that FTP would produce a higher
level of profit over the long run than would be the case if IBM
had maintained the pre-FTP price levels. 96 Although the profitability of individual products under FTP varied, the overall
profitability of the entire FTP program was estimated by IBM
to be twenty-four percent of revenue. 97 In no case did FTP make
any product unprofitable.
In all of the West Coast cases FTP was carefully scrutinized, and in every case it was judged to be a price cut that was
substantially profitable for IBM and also a price cut that was
93.
94.
95.
96.
·97.

Memorex, 458 F. Supp. at 438.
mM's Transamerica Post-Trial Brief, supra note 57, at 65.
Appellants' Opening Brief, supra note 32, at 63.
Appellee's Brief, supra note 32, at 37.
mM's Transamerica Post-Trial Brief, supra note 57, at 68.
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made in response to competition generated by the PCMS.98 Testimony by both plaintiffs' and defendants' witnesses confirmed
the fact that IBM was rapidly losing business to the PCMs. For
example, a Memorex witness testified that unless IBM became
more price competitive, Memorex stood to lose between seventy
to eighty percent of its disk business.99
The lower IBM prices under FTP still were higher than
those of the PCMs. Since predatory pricing means that the
predator's prices are below its own costs (average variable or average total)1oo and it was demonstrated that IBM's prices were
not only profitable but above its costs, the fact that the prices
after FTP were higher than PCM prices confirms that the price
cuts were not below PCM's costs. Hence, after FTP, the PCMs
still had a price advantage, though it was narrower than
before. 101

D. Summary of the Conduct Issues
The strategic response by IBM to the competitive pressure
of PCM products in the time period 1970-73 centered on the
fact that the critical issue for the user of computer products, in
making choices among devices to configure or augment an electronic data processing system, is the ratio of price to performance. 102 Improved performance at the same price, equivalent
performance at a lower price, or ultimately superior performance
at a lower price are the central issues in the competitive process.
This had formed the basis for the growing competitive strength
of the PCMs in the peripherals area. By copying successful IBM
machines, the PCMs offered lower prices for equivalent performance and in some instances improved performance at lowe~
prices. To combat the loss of its peripheral business, IBM followed the same strategy. It redesigned its products and offered
them at lower prices. It changed its traditional marketing methods and offered long-term leases on its products at lower prices.
Its product designs were shown to have technological justification rather than superficial product manipulation. Users were af98. CalComp, 613 F.2d at 741-42.
99. Appellee's Brief, supra note 32, at 27.
100. Transamerica, 481 F. Supp. at 995-6.
101. [d. at 1003-04.
102. Fisher, supra note 138-141.
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forded additional options. In the case of the 2319A, users were
not forced to take the native attachment technology. They could
still use the 2314 disk drive technology. Users of the 360 system
could substitute 2319B technology if they desired a certain configuration of drives, but retain the 2314s if other configurations
were desirable. Finally, if the design changes made by IBM did
not produce better price and/or performance, the user could
change devices or even complete systems.
Long-term leases afforded another option. If a user was not
concerned about new technology superceding old, such user
could opt for a long-term lease at lower prices. If concern existed, the thirty-day lease plan could be retained.
The issues litigated in all of the West Coast cases were essentially those described above. Twelve federal judges (three at
the trial level and nine at the appeals level) unanimously agreed
. that IBM's conduct, even assuming it had monopoly power, was
a manifestation of the competitive' process, finding the end result an enhancement of user welfare through better products at
lower prices. 108
Did IBM's actions increase competitive pressure on the
PCMs? Unquestionably it did. PCMs were forced to lower the
prices of their peripherals and to copy the new IBM products
just as they had copied the old, and their profitability was endangered. Some of the PCMs succumbed to the competitive
pressures and exited the market. Others regrouped and continued to compete successfully.104
The basic premise on which the PCMs entered the peripherals market ultimately proved to be incorrect. IBM did not
remain passive, protecting the growth of new competition with a
price umbrella and static technology. Rather it responded with
price reductions, a new marketing strategy, and improved technology - all manifestations of a dynamic competitive process.
103. At the trial level, Judges McNichols (CalComp), Conti (Memorex), and
Schnacke (Transamerica) issued directed verdicts for IBM. At the appeals level, for each
of the three cases, a three-judge panel affirmed.
104. For a discussion of the activities of the PCMs in the 1970s, see McAdams,
supra, at 294-295.
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THE WEST COAST CASES AND COMPETITIVE BEHAVIOR

A review of the West Coast decisions sheds light on the process of competition in a market situation where technology is
advancing rapidly, where entry into the market is relatively
easy, where buyers have access to multiple options for satisfying
their needs, and where the leading firm could not maintain its
industry position without responding to new competition. The
record in these cases aptly illustrates the action and reaction
among firms that the competitive process is designed to foster. 1011
Have the West Coast decisions changed the law on monopoly? Or have they clarified and perhaps advanced the existing
state of monopoly law as it is applied in a rapidly changing market where such change is fostered, indeed compelled, by new and
improved technology? Never before have the courts confronted
market definition and market conduct issues where rapid technological change was such a pervasive element in the competitive process. The electronic data processing industry was not
like those of petroleum, steel, aluminum, shoe machinery, fire
alarms, or cellophane. This industry, in the space of twenty-five
years, had undergone significant and rapid technological change,
resulting in a panoply of products and services and a dramatic
decline in the cost of information processing. The pace of technological change obviously had the following competitive effects
by requiring: (1) firms to seek and adopt new ways of performing
the computing functions; (2) firms to pursue product excellence
through improved performance; (3) firms to seek and adopt new
ways of performing the computing function; (4) continued reevaluation of prices, since price/performance was the key to firm
profitability and survival; and (5) firms to respond to emerging
competition from a variety of sources - leasing companies,
time-sharing, service bureaus, mini-computers, microprocessors,
plug-compatible processors and peripherals, and software
development.
Thus it can be seen that electronic data processing was an
industry in ferment. Change was the norm, not the exception.
The rapid development of new products and new ways of satis105. For insights into this process see Fisher, "Diagnosing Monopoly," 19 Quarterly
Journal of Economics and Business 7 (1979).
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fying user needs was a continuous process, forcing firms to
scramble for market position. The conduct of the leading firm,
IBM, must be analyzed in this context. IBM had developed the
disk drive and initially had 100 percent of the market. Unquestionably, since disks were a superior storage device, they were a
highly profitable aspect of IBM's business. New competition in
the form of PCMs perceived an opportunity to enter the disk
market and compete with the industry leader by copying its successful products and offering them to users as replacements. Because of lower production costs, the PCMs offered lower prices
and made significant inroads into IBM's disk market placements. Recognizing the competitive threat, IBM formulated
strategies to head off this growing competition in order to retain
its market position. These strategies took the form of price reductions, product design changes, and marketing methods.
PCMs had entered the disk submarket on the assumption that
IBM would not respond to their competition in the price area,
i.e., they assumed that IBM would leave its prices unchanged,
thus providing a price umbrella under which they could flourish.
This assumption proved incorrect. Thus the West Coast cases
developed and provided the courts an opportunity to apply current monopoly law to a new environment. The result was a clarification of what a leading firm in a dynamic industry may do in
response to competitive pressure.
The well-known dictum from Alcoa, often quoted but rarely
applied, emerges as a major factor in the new approach to monopoly stemming from the West Coast cases:' "The successful
competitor, having been urged to compete, must not be turned
upon when he wins.lIloe
Was IBM a successful competitor? What tactics can a firm
with assumed monopoly power pursue? The fashioning of a legal
rule to govern a large firm's conduct is difficult and imprecise.
However, the West Coast cases seemingly have broadened this
conduct to include a strategic combination of price, product
modification, and marketing approaches that are made in response to competition and are designed to maintain or improve
the large firm's market position.
106. U.S. v. Aluminum Co. of America, supra, at 480.
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The Transamerica court spoke for all of the Ninth Circuit
judges when it said:
It is an unwise policy for the law to coddle competitors, especially if the protection comes at the
expense of destroying a larger firm's incentive to
compete. Even companies that choose to enter
dominated markets must be prepared to face
competition on the merits. Where a monopolist
chooses an alternative that does not unreasonably
restrict competition, the law is not offended. It is
the choice of an unreasonable alternative not the
failure to choose the least restrictive alternative,
that leads to liability.lo7

Further, it said:
IBM did not lie dead in the water when faced
with competition. It took action. And the action it
took may have caused some competitors to suffer
more than other actions would have. But the action IBM took, under the circumstances in which
it acted, did not unreasonably restrict competition, and thus did not violate the law. lOS

Thus, the West Coast cases helped to clarify and advance
the state of monopoly law, especially as applied to a rapidly
changing industry where the industry leader must respond to
competitive pressures emanating from smaller firms seeking to
erode that leading position. The cases, building on the Alcoa/
United Shoe/Grinnell tests, avoided equating monopoly power
with market share and focused on market conduct and the resulting market performance. Determining that IBM's conduct
produced lower prices, superior products that enhanced user
choice, and alternative terms for acquiring those products, the
courts in the West Coast cases emphasized that these are the
results expected from competition, not monopoly.
The cases established the premise that for conduct to be anticompetitive, it must produce results that are inconsistent with
competition - higher prices and inferior products plus failure to
adjust to user demands. None of these were present in the West
107. Transamerica, supra, at 1022.
108.Id.
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Coast cases. The fact that individual competitors suffered discomfort in the form of lower profits or perhaps eventual exit
from the market does not suggest the use of monopoly power. In
CalComp, Memorex, and Transamerica the issue was competition, not competitors, and the outcomes were consistent with
traditional economic analysis.

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol14/iss2/4

26

